America created the world order—what happens when it leaves?

A new world order is emerging.

This is a guest essay by Mark Lutter for Post Nation, seven writers exploring a world after nation-states. Support the project and collect the series as a digital or print pamphlet 👇🏻

For my lifetime, the map of the world has appeared oddly permanent. Borders have been stable, new countries relatively rare. History was over, to borrow Fukuyama’s phrase. The nation-state is a natural and durable political unit with intrinsic sovereignty. Countries, in general, do not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries.

Today, we can see the beginnings of change. Between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland, the spat between Rwanda and DRC, and the potential buying of Greenland, borders and countries are once again in flux. Understanding the origin of the current order is crucial to understanding where we go next.

Nation-states, at least in the modern sense, first emerged in Europe, in particular during the 30 Years War that birthed the Westphalian order. After the ravages of war, where an estimated 30% of the population died, peace was created. This peace was sustained by nation-states. What happened within a nation-state was up to them. However, a nation-state using force against other nation-states was generally forbidden.

This order has continued to the present day. Of course, it contains many exceptions for powerful countries, but the fiction was real and useful. Heads of state are treated with respect. Secessionist movements are strongly looked down upon by the international community. Changing borders is forbidden.

In some ways, the current order reflects the original Westphalian peace. Countries are supposed to control violence within their borders, and if they do they are respected as a country. However, that facsimile reflection obscures the underlying changes of the force containment and projection. In reality, the Westphalian order can be broken into two phases, the European order and the American order.

The European order is where nation-states first emerged. The process was hardly smooth, and the Westphalian peace hardly stopped state violence; however there were the conditions for an emerging framework for states to engage each other as equals or close to it. After World War II, this framework was applied, particularly through decolonization. However, while the European order was premised on force projection by nation-states or groups thereof, the American order was nearly entirely enforced by America. There was no balance of power.

As America withdraws from its role of global policeman, the global order we supported will decay. The polite fiction of nation-states will go away. Power politics will return. Regional hegemons will exert their influence, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly. Institutional variety will increase, though institutional complexity, especially at the periphery, will decrease.

Understanding the future requires understanding the past. How did the current order emerge? How was it created, accepted, or imposed on different parts of the world?

Emergence

The Westphalian order emerged following the Peace of Westphalia. The common, simple story is that following the 30 Years War, which devastated Europe, leading to deaths of 30% of the population in some regions, the relevant powers, including the Holy Roman Empire, French, Swedish, Spanish, Dutch, and the Papacy, got together and agreed on mutually recognized sovereignty. Namely, that each country had exclusive jurisdiction over what happened within its territory.

Of course, history is rarely so simple. The peace of Westphalia guaranteed a quite limited freedom of religion in the Holy Roman Empire, and re-arranged some borders, hardly consistent with what we think of as the Westphalian system today.

Nevertheless, given the subsequent scholarship and the fact that myths, sometimes incomplete or incorrect, do influence the world today, it is useful to start the Westphalian order during the Peace of Westphalia. Further, the idea of sovereignty and mutual non-interference emerged organically and chaotically over time. It was not handed down from Mount Olympus.

The European order that followed Westphalia was not peaceful, but it was constrained. Sovereignty was backed by retaliatory capacity. States that violated the autonomy of others faced predictable coalitions, not moral condemnation alone. War was common, but it was generally limited in scope and objective.

In addition to the threat of retaliatory violence, Europe had another key condition for evolving the Westphalian system: Britain. As an island, Britain had more flexible alliances than other countries. They did not have enough power to conquer Europe. Their role, therefore, was to prevent a hegemon from emerging. They would fund allies, enter conflicts late, and ensure a balance of power.

Of course, this relative equilibrium did not apply outside Europe. European countries conquered and colonized where they could. It was only in Europe, where there was a threat of reciprocal violence, that drove restraint.

Inside Europe, however, a set of norms and practices emerged to protect the Westphalian system. This included permanent embassies that would continue even during war, legal theories about what constituted a ‘just war’, and increased trade and commercial power. These norms and practices further embedded the Westphalian system.

The greatest challenge to the Westphalian system until the 20th century was Napoleon. France, which at the time had a relative population of Europe far higher than today, and was in the early stages of industrialization, almost conquered Europe. Napoleon marched to and burned Moscow, but was ultimately defeated, not once, but twice, by coalitions that wanted to preserve the status quo. The Westphalian system did not prevent Napoleon’s success, but instead is how we describe interstate relations resulting from the balance of power.

In the late 19th century, Japan, during the Meiji restoration, demonstrated the first example of a non-European or neo-European country entering the Westphalian system. Japan was effectively sovereign prior to Commodore Perry’s gunboat, as its island nature allowed independence and self-directed action. However, once encountering American and European technology and military prowess, Japan realized they would have to ‘catch up,’ or risk being on the menu.

This catching up not only required technological, social, and military advancement, but also a change in their relations with other East Asian powers. East Asia did not have the Westphalian concept of Sovereignty. Borders were ill-defined. Trade was politically subordinate to politics in a way distinct from Europe. Countries were expected to pay tribute to China, the regional hegemon.

East Asian sovereignty norms developed distinctly from European norms because of differing initial conditions. While Europe was difficult for a single country to conquer, leading to a relative balance of power, China was the hegemonic power in East Asia. Their hegemony, combined with the inability of most states to threaten reciprocal violence, led to a different understanding of the relationships between states.

To emerge as an equal to European states, Japan at the time required an unprecedented modernization effort. It had to restructure society, import top European talent to learn from, and become militarily competent to challenge European powers. Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905 solidified its place as the only non-European/neo-European power. Most countries and people were unable to modernize effectively, leading them to be taken advantage of by European states.

Post-war order

The European Westphalian order failed. However, it did not fail because its norms collapsed, but because the balance of power broke down in the face of industrialized and ideological war. In fact, the norms outlived the system that created them.

Germany, at one point, conquered nearly all of continental Europe. America, playing the historic role of Britain, financed and empowered a coalition to defeat not just Germany, but also Japan. However, unlike Britain, America had sufficient wealth and industrial capacity to impose a new kind of peace. Rather than a negotiated settlement meant to maintain a balance of power. America asked for, and received, unconditional surrender.

While the Westphalian norms remained, they were no longer underwritten by the mechanism by which they originated. Gone was the carefully constructed balance of power. The new order was maintained by 1) Europe horrified by the consequences of industrial war and more importantly 2) American military power. The European Westphalian order was defined by reciprocity; the post-war Westphalian order was defined by hierarchy.

The Suez Canal crisis illustrated the new Westphalian order. After Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, France and Britain, two historic powers, allied with Israel to take control of the canal. They attacked, and would have won, except the United States and Soviet Union put immense pressure on them, causing them to withdraw. Their military superiority was insufficient to achieve their political objectives.

During the European Westphalian order, the Suez invasion likely would have succeeded. It was justified legally, by both France and Britain being shareholders in the Suez and having treaty rights. It was justified strategically given the importance of the Suez to shipping lanes. Egypt lacked the ability to defend their claim, much less threaten France or Britain.

America, however, was worried that allowing the invasion would strengthen the Soviet Union’s position in the Middle East. They put France and Britain under immense pressure, both financial and diplomatic, forcing them to abandon their goals. The European Westphalian order constrained states through reciprocity; now states were constrained through hierarchy.

This is further illustrated via decolonization. Dozens of new states were created as countries in Africa and Asia declared independence from their colonial masters. These states had many, if not all, the rituals and recognition associated with modern states. They had a recognized territorial monopoly of violence, their borders were defined, they hosted and had permanent embassies, they joined international organizations, they decided who was able to enter their countries and under what conditions.

Decolonization fundamentally altered the international system by universalizing sovereignty. What was once won by industrial and military might became an automatic entitlement. Newly independent states inherited borders drawn for administrative convenience rather than political coherence, yet these borders were rendered inviolable by postwar norms, or more explicitly, American power. States were formally equal despite radically unequal capacity. Non-intervention became moralized, border revision delegitimized, and internal disorder treated as a domestic affair.

The global Westphalian order was premised on American power. Usually diplomatic and financial pressure were sufficient to encourage countries to fall in line. When they weren’t, America would use force. Of course, the force was sometimes inconsistently applied. However, it was sufficient to freeze borders, and often polities, around the world.

The future

Today we are seeing cracks in the order. America is no longer interested in being the global policeman. The withdrawal of American power is thawing conflicts, creating uncertainty. The changes can be seen across the world. From Russia waging war against Ukraine, to Israel recognizing Somaliland, to America attempting to buy Greenland, history is back.

Given the world today, I probably don’t have to convince the reader that the old order is changing. Mark Carney’s recent Davos Speech illustrates that even Heads of Government of G7 countries are acknowledging the changes. The global Westphalian order was a historical oddity dependent on a relatively benevolent hegemon imposing a European governance form on the world.

The easiest frame for understanding the future is to examine the past. Historic organizational forms will re-assert themselves. The uncertainty is on the edges, how old forms re-assert themselves within and around the old order. Institutional variation will increase, as old forms wither and increased competition forces the emergence of new.

Europe, where the original Westphalian order emerged, will continue to follow it. Europe does, however, have pressures that could lead to further changes. First, the EU is not Westphalian. It is a continent-wide trade, migration, and, to some extent, currency zone. A generation of Europeans have been raised within it, often thinking of themselves as European first, and their nationality second. Russian pressure could accelerate the transformation of the EU into a state, though given the internal EU stresses, such an outcome is hardly guaranteed. Further, demographic change via migration will likely change European states further, as the populations have less identification with their host countries.

The Americas are likely to continue within the Westphalian tradition as well, albeit, a more hegemonic one. Via the Donroe Doctrine, the current administration, and almost certainly future administrations, will ensure peace and stability in North and South America. Trade deals might become more one-sided than previously, but borders and governments will generally remain unchanged.

East Asia is likely to return to the historic norm as well, dominated by China. Unlike the American order, China’s role in East Asia would not rest on universal rules or formal equality, but on asymmetric relationships calibrated by proximity, dependence, and usefulness. China is likely to tolerate ambiguity—using economic leverage, selective coercion, and political pressure to shape outcomes. This mirrors historic East Asian practice, where hierarchy reduced transaction costs and stabilized expectations, even as sovereignty remained conditional rather than absolute.

The future of the Middle East is more uncertain. Most countries have relatively limited experience with modern statehood, with their borders being a recent invention. The importance of oil to the global economy has attracted American interest which has preserved the status quo. However, as America is energy independent and appears to be withdrawing interest, the future is open. Kuwait, for example, was invaded by Iraq, and only exists today because of American intervention.

The survival of small states with large oil reserves—like Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar—could be threatened. It’s possible China steps in as the hegemon to ensure order. China is a huge energy importer, and keeping oil flowing is important to its economy. However, as of today, China does not have force projection capability to act as the hegemon.

Africa faces a challenging future. While it will remain integrated into the global economy on certain margins, its inability to industrialize makes African states weak. Demand for natural resources, and to a lesser extent, people, will continue. However, most African states will have poor negotiating power. Worst-case scenarios include states losing their territorial monopoly of violence, with bandits and more organized militant groups taking control of territories. The form of national governments might continue, as it gives Western countries and companies a counterparty they can interact with. However, the function of some national governments might become a shadow of what they once were.

Perhaps the most important lesson is to widen the possibilities of how power is exercised in the future. For the past 50 years, it has been taken for granted that states held a monopoly of violence. Most countries would ape liberal democracies, with autocrats holding elections understanding the legitimacy it granted them, even if the elections were rigged.

Moving forward, expect to see more forms of power that are less legible. It might be a regional hegemon making loans to another country and using those loans to influence policy. It might be an organized insurgency that requires payment for transit through their territory. It might be a special economic zone controlled by an opaque corporate actor. The standardization that accompanied the nation-state will recede.

Order is ultimately defined by the use of force. The Westphalian order emerged in Europe because multiple countries were capable of reciprocal violence, and Britain, by virtue of being an island, ensured that no single country could dominate. This order was then imposed globally by the United States.

As America withdraws from our role as global policeman, the order which we enforced will change.